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IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
. AT RICHl\·fOND. 
ELLA BAKER 
vs. 
NUSS~iAN & COX, AND A~iERTCAN MUTUAL LIA· 
BI.LITY INSURANCE 001\iP ANY. 
PETITION. 
To .the Honorable J~tdges of the S~tprmne Court of Appeals 
of V-irginia: 
Your petitioner, Ella Baker, respectfully represents that 
she is aggrieved by an award of the Industrial Commission 
of Virginia, entered in the above-styled cause on the 8th day 
of October, 1928, and mailed out on September 28, 1928, a 
copy of the record. in said cause being attached as a part 
of this petition. 
The finding of facts hy the Industrial Commission of Vir-
ginia is substantially as follows: 
Nussman & Cox are general contractors 'vho had contracted 
t.o rebuild for the owners a hnilcling in the City of Suffolk, 
· v ..irginia, whieh had been hnrned. As a part of their work, 
it wa~ necessary to tear do"·n a part of two walls and to re-
move the debris. Nnssman & Cox engaged :Madison Baker 
(husband of petitioner) to do this part of tho work. "He. 
was to he paid the flat snm of $180.00; was to furnish all the 
team, tools", ete. N"nssman & Cox "retained absolute and 
entire control over the means, methods and details of doing 
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the work in question. (See R.ec., p. 8.) Baker had been in 
their employment for seven years, sometimes being paid by 
the job and at others by the time. He was considered by 
N ussman & Cox as an employee, and his service was per-
formed in that understanding·. lie was carried on 1he pay-
rolls along with their other employees and was included 
am,ong the employees in the list furnished the Insurance Car-
rier. While engaged in the performance of this work, one 
of the walls fell on him and killed him. The accident was 
reported to the Insurance Carrier as an injury to their em-
ployee, and in the report of N ussman & Cox to the Indus-
trial Commission he was declared to be .an employee, and at 
the time of the accident Nussman was present supervising 
and directing the entire work, other employees of Kussman 
& Cox being at the same time engaged in the work of recon-
structing the building. 
From an examination of the facts as found by the Commis-
sion, it will be seen that although ~Iadison Baker was to be 
. paid a specified sum for the work to be done and was to employ 
his own equipment, yet the work to be done by him was to be 
under the absolute and entire control of Nussman & Cox, 
not only as to the results, but as to the methods, means and 
details of doing the work, with the right in Nussman & Cox 
to supervise and control 'vhen, where and how the work 
should be done, even to the extent of stopping the work when 
they pleased. (Ree., pp. 8 and 12.) With fairnoss and 
frankness this is conceded by the Industrial Commission of 
'Virginia. Says the opinion of the Commission : 
"It may be freely admitted that Nussman and Cox re-
tained absolute and entire control over the means, methods 
and details of doing the work in question, without in any 
·way altering the fact that the deceased was a sub-contractor 
under Section 20. (a).'' 
Under 'veil established principles, unless Section 20 (a) of 
the Workmen's Compensation Act changes the character of 
his status as created by his contract, the retention of thls 
control over the means, methods and details of doing the 
'vork fixes the relation of Baker with N ussman and Cox as 
that of employer and employee. 
In 39 C. J. 1316, it is said: 
''If the employee is subjec.t to the control of the employer 
Ella Baker v. N ussman & Cox, etc. 3 
as to the means, he is not an independent contractor; and this 
is so, although the contractor hires and discharg·es employees 
and pays them out of money received from the contract, or 
althoug·h he received a specified compensation for his services, 
not in the na hue of wages.'' 
In North Ben Lnmber Contpat1ZJJ v. C. J11. & P. S! R. Co., 
'CVVashington), 135 Pac. 1022, the court said: 
''If such right of control is retained, if the employer re-
serves to himself, or to his representative, the rig·ht to con-
trol at his pleasure the manner and means by which the 
work contracted for is to be accomplished, if the employer 
may stand by and tell the person undertaking the 'vork where, 
w·hen and how· it shall be performed, such person is the agent 
and servant of the employer and not an independent con-
tractor." 
The above was quoted in the case of Dish-ma.n v. Whitney, 
29 A. L. H. 46'0, where it was said ( 465) : 
''One of the tests to determine the question is whether tho 
employer retained the right, or had the right under the con-
. tract, to control the mode or manner in which the work was 
to be done. \Vhcre the fac.ts presented are as consistent 
with the theory of agency as with that of independent con-
tractor, the burden is upon the one asserting the independ-
encv of the contractor to show the true relation of the 
pa1:ties. '' 
In J(in,q v. II arfnng, 1~:3 'la. 185, it is said: 
"Where the landowner who has employed a competent 
workman to erect a gate is present exercising a general super-
vision over the work, the employee is not an independent con-
tractor.'' 
R.ecog:nizing these established principles, the Industrial 
Commission of Virginia, itself, in Shupe v. Carter LU/ntber 
Company, 6 0. I. C. ~05, 2m>, quoted with approval the lan-
·guage of the court in Thompson v. Twiss, HO Conn. 444; 97 
.A.tl. 3:24, as follows: 
"The decisive test is: who has the right to direct what 
should be done and how aud when it should be done"1 \Vho 
has the right of general control?'' 
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A multiplication of authorities might easily he cited, but 
they are unnecessary as the opinion of the Commission con-
cedes them, but holds that they are inapplicable because Sec-
tion 20 (a) of the vVorkmen 's Compensation Ac.t changes the 
comman law rule, and, itself, gives to ~1adison Baker an-
other and different status. 
Says the opinion of the Industrial Commission (p. 8): 
''As said above, 've are not concerned with applying the 
common hiw tests of independent contractor when a principal 
contracts with another for the performance by or under such 
other of a part of the principal's trade, l>usiness or occupa-
tion, where such other must secure employees to operate un-
der him in the work. If he has done so, section 20 (a) comes 
into play and such other becomes the sub-contractor and not 
an employee.'' 
Concretely speaking, it is the decision of ·the Industrial 
Commission of Virginia that although, by the term::; of his 
contract with Nussman & Cox, n1adison Bal{er, if he had 
performed the 'vork alone (as he had the perfect t·ight to 
do) and had been injured in such performance -alone, would 
have been an employee and the claimant would be entitled 
to compensation; but, if he employs another to assist him, 
and is himself injured while performing the work, then his 
Rtatus is changed and he is no longer an employeH and is 
not entitled to compensation. And this is so, the Commis-
sion holds, solely and wholly because of Section 20 (a) of the 
\Vorkmeu's Compensation Act. Does Section 20 (a) bear 
such strange and unreasonable con~truction? Can tho statute 
possibly intend to provide compensation to an employee, and 
deny it to him should he employ assistance, when he is in-
jured in the performance of the work in 'vhich he ·was em-
ployed,· and the employment of assistance in no way con-
tributed to the injury 1 
Section 20 (a) is as follows: 
"Where any person (in this section referred to as 'o,vner'} 
undertakes to perform or execute any work which is a part 
of his trade, business or occupation and contracts with any 
other person (in this section referred to as 'subcontractor') 
for the execution or performance by or under such sub-con-
tractor of the whole or any part of the work undertaken 
by su.ch owner, the cnvner .shall be liable to pay to any work-
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man employed in the work any compensation under this act 
'vhich he would have been liable to pay if the ·workman had 
been immediately employed by him. 
Where any person (in this section referred to as 'contrac-
tor') contracts to perform or execute any work for another 
person which work or undertaking is not a part of the trade, 
business or occupation of such other person and contracts with 
any other person (in this section referred to as 'sub-con-
tractor') for the execution or performance by or under the 
sub-contractor of the whole or any part of the work under-
. taken by such contractor, then the contractor shall be liable 
to pay to any 'vorkman employed in the work any compen-
sation under this act. which he would have been liable to pay 
if that·workman had been immediately employed by him. 
Wh~re the sub-.contractor, as the term is hereinbefore 
used, in turn contracts with still another person (in this sec-
tion also referred to as '.subcontractor') for the performance 
or execution by or under such last sub-contractor of the 
'vhole or any part of the_ work undertaken by the first sub-
contractor, then the liability of the owner or contractor, as 
those terms are hereinbefore used, shall be tl1e same as the 
liability imposed by the preceding paragraphs of this sub-
section. 
vVhere compensation is claimed from or proceedings are 
taken against the o'~'1Ier or contractor, as those terms are 
hereinbefore used, then, in the application of this act refer-
ence -to the owner or contractor shall be substituted for refer-
ence to the sub-contractor, except that the amount of com-
pensation shall be calculated with reference to the earnings 
of the workman under the sub-eontractor by whom he is im-
mediately employed.'' 
It is true that in this case Nussman & Cox contracted with 
~fadison Baker to do 'vork which was a part of their trade, 
business or· occupation, and that :Madison Baker contracted 
with a"'lother (Bynum) to assist him in the performance of 
the work . .As a matter of fact he did not contract 'vith Bynum 
to do any specific part of the work, but merely to assist him 
in its performance. 
The Commission says (p. 4) that when this situation arises 
the provisions of Section 20 (a) come into effect. vVe say 
they do not, unless and until Bynum is injured, and then only 
as to the right of Bynum to compensation. 
It is obvious that the ·whole object, purpose and effect of 
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this section is to provide compensation for the sen,ants of 
the contractee. It was not intended to, nor doe.s it change 
or effect the status or relationship of the original parties in 
any manner whatsoever. ·until this section was added to the 
statute, Bynum, if injured, would have not been entitled to 
any compensation, and we repeat that the only purpose and 
intent of this section is to provide compensation for persons 
having the relationship which Bynum occupied, the en1ployees 
of ''such other'' mentioned in the section. And section 20 
_(a) is not involved and has no application whatever except 
,vhen the injury is to the employes of such other p~rson. It · 
has no application when the injury is to H such other" him-
self. If Bynum had been injured the section 'vould be ap-
plicable a.s providing compensation for him, but it has no 
application, in any way, when Baker, himself, is injured. 
Only in cases where the injury is to the employees of a sub-
contractor is the rule of independent contractorship abro-
gated, for under the common law the employees of an inde-
pendent contractor could not recover of the contractor, but 
by section 20 (a) they may recover. To this extent, and to 
this only, has the test of whether the relationship of master 
and servant, or of independent contractorship, been abro-
gated, and we presume it was in the case of an injury to. such 
employes that Judge Crump referred in the case cited. 
· Section 20 (a) does not deal a.t all 'vith a case in which the 
original contractee is injured. His right to compensation 
must be determined by other provisions of the act, namely, 
Section 2 (b) which defines an employee as follows: 
" 'Employee' shall include every person, including a minor, 
in the service of another under any contract of hire or ap-
prenticeship, 'vritten or implied, except one whose employ-
ment is not in the usual eourse of the trade, business, occu-
pation or profession of the employer." 
Baker came clearly within this definition. He was in the 
service of Nussman & Cox, under a co·ntract of hire, absolute 
control being retained over him, and his mnpZoyn~e-nt was in 
the us·ual course of the bu.siness of his mnployer. 
We surmise that the Industrial Commission of ·virginia, 
in applying Section 20 (a) to this case in which the injury. 
'vas to the original contractee and not to his employee, im-
pr~-tf.ly as we think, was misled by the reference, in said . 
se. ....... I 1:Y -ne.. Wov~s ,, ~e~e.rteJ 1(, (.U 9.s.tbe,nfr~ 
- - ------------------
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The words ''in this section referred to as sub-contractor'' 
were clearly intended as a designation and not as a defini-
tion, for it would be unreasonable to say that it was intended 
thereby that one 'vho ·was, by his contract, an employee, and, 
'vho was injured in the course of his employment, should lose 
his rig·ht to compensation if he employed another to help him. 
Every one who enters into a contract with another, whether 
it be a contract of hiring or not, is, of course, a contractor, 
and every such contract.or, though he be an employee, who 
contracts with another, is, in a general sense, a sub-contractor. 
It was obviously in this general sense that the designation 
is made, for sake of clarity and not to change his status to 
that of an independent contractor. 
We submit, therefore, that Section 20 (a) has application 
only where the 8ervant of a .sub-contractor (whether such 
sub-contractor is an employee or an independent contractor) 
is injured, and has no applictaion, at a.Jl, to a case in which 
the injury is to the person designated in the section as sub-
contractor. If such person, thus· referred to, for designa-
tion as a sub-contractor, is by his contract au employee, and 
is himself injured in the course of his employment as such, 
his rights are in no wise determined nor affected by any of 
the provisions of Section: 20 (a) which has no application as 
to him. 
Since it seems to be a concess1t/nt in the decision of the -
Industrial Commission of Virginia that but for Section 20 
(a) the claimant 'vould be entitled to compensa.tion, it fol-
lows that if that section has no application to this case, the 
decision of the Industrial Commission is erroneous. 
"'\Ve, therefore, pray that an appeal or writ of error and 
s1tpersedeas, as the case may be, may be awarded your peti-
tioner, that the case may be reviewed and reversed, and that 
this court will enter such judgment as may be proper . 
.And your petitioner "rill ever pray, etc. 
ELLA BATCER, 
By ,JNO. N. SEBRELL, Attorney. 
I, John N. Sebrell, au attorn~y practicing in the S'upreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia, do hereby certify that, in my 
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opinion, the award of the Industrial Commission of ·virginia 
complained of in the foregoing petition should be reviewed 
by this Court. · 
JNO. N. SEBRE:LL. 
Received October 24, 1928. 
H. S. J. 
Appeal ano,ved, SUlJersedeas awarded. Bond $250. 
ROBERT R. PRENTIS .. 
Received October 24, 1928. 
H. S. J. 
Claim No. 86501 
Case of Madison Baker 
NOTICE OF A WARD. 
Date October 8, 1928. 
To N ussman & Cox (Employer) 
Suffolk, Virginia~ 
and Mrs. Ella Baker, et als, (Claimants) 
R. F. D. 2, Box #25, 
Suffolk, Virginia. 
and· American ~Iutual Liability 
.Insurance Company (Insurance Carrier) , 
Norfolk, Virginia, and 
Richmond, Virginia. 
You are hereby notified that a review before the full Com-
mission was held in the above styled case at Richmond, Vir-
ginia, on September 5, 1928, and· a decision rendered on Sep-
tember 25, 1928, adopting the Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of La,v of the Hearing Commissioner, with certain 
additions as to the Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law of the full Commission, and affirming in all 
respects the award issued thereon. 
INDUSTRIAL CO~i~fiSSION OF VIR.GINIA. 
BOLLING H. HANDY, Chairman. 
Attest: 
W. F. BURSEY, Secretary. 
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1\'Iadison Baker, Deceased; Ella Baker, Claimant, 
v. 
Nussman & Cox, Employer; American Mutual Liability In-
surance Company, Insurance Carrier. . 
Claim No. 86501. 
September 25, 1928. 
John N. S'ebrell, Attorney-at-Law, Norfolk, Virginia, for 
the Claimant. 
S. S. P. Patteson, R.ives and Cunningham (S. S. P. Patte-
son), Attorneys-at-Law, for the Insurance Carrier. 
Review before the Full Commission at Richmond, Virginia, 
September 5, 1928. 
HANDY, Chairman, rendered the opinion. 
FINDINGS OF FACT. 
By award dated 1\Iarch 29, 1928, the claim for compensa-
tion on behalf of Ella Baker, the wido\v of 1\iidson Baker, 
the deceased, was dismissed upon the ground that the said 
l\iadision Baker was .a sub-contractor and not an employee 
of Nussman & Cox at the time of hi~ death. The sole ques-
tion presented upon review is the one thus disposed 
page 3 ~ of by the Hearing Commissioner. 
At the outset, it \viii probably be l1elpful to make 
certain general observations as to the views of the Commis-
sion in such situations. 'l'o begin with, where it appears that 
an owner or principal contractor has undertaken to perform 
a part of such owners' usual trade, business or occupa.tion 
throug·h contracf \vith another party, who, in turn, employs 
laborers or employees, it is the employees so engaged by 
the other or sub-contractor that the compensation law is pri-
marily concerned with. Such persons so engaged by the 
sub-contractor are not the employees of the principal as that 
term is dennecl or described in Section 2 (b) of the Act and 
"rould not in most cases fall within the compensation pro-
-visions "rere it not for Section 20 (a). This is so because 
the sub-contractor whose employees they are, frequently does 
not have enough employees to make him amenable to the Act, 
if his situation alone be considered. 
10 S'upreme Court o~ Appeals of Virginia. 
In determining, therefore, w·hether S'ection 20 (a) applies 
to a particular situation, we ean not simply look entirely and 
solely to the relationship established between .the principal 
and the alleged sub-contractor. This is what we do when 
no question arises of a part of an employer's 'vork having 
been contracted out to be done by another, who, in turn, has 
employed help. Where there are only two parties involved-
the principal and the other with whom he contracts 
page 4 ~ -than we do look to the relationship between them, 
and the character of the control vested in the prin-
cipal or alleged employer becomes a very important ele-
ment. But, if it appears that there may be a case where an 
employer or principal has contra0ted with another for the 
performance by or through that other of a part of such em-
ployer's usual trade, business or occupation, and such other, 
in turn, engages employees to do the work under him, then 
the whole matter chan2'es. The law here concerns itself with 
protecting the employees of such sub-contractor, not the sub-
contractor himself. It makes the principal or owner entirely 
responsible for compensation to !=>uch employees (giving him 
a right of recovery over agains·t his sub-contractor) although 
there is no direct contract of hire between them. When this 
situation appears, we are no longer directed to look to the 
character of control as between the principal or owner and the 
one with whom he has directly contracted. The tests laid 
down for our guidance are these: 
(1) Is the work being done a part of the owner's usual 
trad~, business or occupation~ and 
(2) Has he contracted with another for the execution or 
·performance by or under such other of the whole or any part 
of such 'vork f 
If these two questions be answered in the affirmative, then 
:has arisen the situation Section 20 (a) was meant to cover, 
·and its provisions come into effect. The Compensation Law 
ceases then to think of the su b-cou tractor or the 
page 5 ~ party contracting directly with the principal and 
·. . turns its attention solely to the employee of such 
sub-contractor. 
· This is why it is so fallacious to bring in the colDlnon law 
definitions or tests as to independent contractors in this con-
:nection. It may well be that the character of control resting 
\with a person contracting with another for the·performance 
of certain work "WOuld not be such as to make sueh other 
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person an independent contractor at common law, and yet 
such a one might clearly be a sub-contractor under Section 
20 (a), and not an employee under 2 (b). It is not really 
necessary or helpful but the contrary to bring in the common 
law tests as to independent contractor in solving such ques-
tions under the Compensation Act. If the owner has con-
tracted for the performance by or under another of a part 
of his usual trade, business or occupation, then he is liable 
to the employees of ~uch other for compensation, but not 
to such other, himself, and this entirely regardless of whether 
at common law such other would have been regarded as an 
employee or as an independent contractor. The Compen-
sation Act has set up its own standards, tests and rulee fm 
liability. Judge Crump, of the Law and Equity Court of 
'Richmond, said, in the case of Bray v. Phaup and Tinsley, re-
ported in 1 0. I. C. 13: 
page 6} "Whatever may have been the intention of the 
Act, the result of its language is to .abrogate the 
technical doctrine of independent contractor as understood 
in the law of master and servant in the application of the 
provisions of the Act to cases arising under it." 
Obviously, what has been said above makes it apparent 
that the authorities cited and discussed in the brief of coun-
sel for the claimant are here inapplicable. They are cases 
where the sole question involved was between two persons 
-the principal or owner and another with whom he had con-
tracted. None of them seem to have been considered along 
the line which we must follow under Section 20 (a) when 
there are involved employees of the person with whom the 
principal has contracted. Of course, any case considered 
must be regarded in the light of the language of the statute 
in the jurisdiction in question. Counsel does not inform us 
whether the· jurisdiction from which come the cases cited 
have statutory provisions similar to our Section 20 (a). 
In the case of J antes v. N ation.al Cash Register Co1npany, 
8 0. I. C. 335, this Commission did examine the statutes 
of several States similar to our 20 (a) and cases cited there-
under, and it was found that their construction of such pro-
visions appear .similar to our own. · 
Obviously, then, we must here apply the tests 
page 7 ~ laid down above to the facts of this case. We :find 
that N ussman & Cox is a firm engaged in the busi-
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ness of general building contracting in Suffolk. This was 
their trade, business or occupation. Pursuant thereto, they 
made a contract to rebuild a building which had been dam-
aged by fire. As an integral part of this contract, they un-
dertook to take do,vn the wall and remoYe the debris from 
the burned building. Obviously, they could not begin con-
struction until these things 'vere done, and we imagine that 
the agreement to do sur.h "\York is quite usuall:r a part of simi-
lar undertakings by building contractors. At any rate, such 
was the situation here and it could not he contended that 
the preliminary work of tearing down the wall and remoYing 
the debris was not so closely related to the repair and re-
building as not to make the former a part of the latter, cer-
tainly so far as being a part of the usual work of the building 
contractor is concerned. Tearing do,vn of the wall and re-
moval of this debris "\Vas, therefore, a part of the usual 
trade, business or occupation of Nussman & Cox, Con-
tractors. 
Nussman & Cox made a contract with the deceased, ~fadi­
son Baker, to tear down the wall and remoye the debris. He 
was to be paid a flat sum of $180.00, was to furnish all the 
teams, tools, etc., and to employ his o"\vn labor. Sush, in its 
essence, was the contract under which he was at 
page 8 ~ work when killed. It may be freely admitted that 
Nnssman & Cox retained absolute and entire con-
trol over the means, methods and details of doing the work 
in question, \vithout in any way altering the fact that the 
deceased 'vas a sub-contractor under Section 20 (a). As 
said above; we are not concerned with applying the common 
law tests of independent contractor when a principal con-
tracts \vith another for the performance by or under such 
other of a part of the principal's trade, business or occupa-
tion, where such other must secure employees to operate un-
der him in the work. If he has done so, Section 20 (a) comes 
into play and such other becomes the sub-contractor and not 
an employee. The deceased in this case certainly employed 
others to help him in the tearing down of the wall and re-
moval of the debris. 
A short answer to the essential question here involYed 
might be arrived at by asking whether or not one of the 
helpers cnga.g·ed by the deceased could have looked to N uss-
man & Cox for compensation, had he lJeen injured w·hile at 
this work. lie certainly could have clone so if any effect 
whateYer is to be given the provisions of Section 20 (a). 
Then, just as certainly does it follo\V that the deceased was 
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the sub-contractor . under that same section and not an em-
ployee under Section 2 (b). This. is the crux of the whole 
matter. 
The reason for the distinction thus made as to allowance 
of compensation between an employee and a sub-
page 9 ~ contractor is not diffi·cult to see. An employee is one 
operating under : l a contract of hire". Obviously, 
the one intended here to be protected is the ordinary laborer 
selling his days labor as his sole commodity. One, however, 
who has advanced to the TJOint where he deals in the labor 
of others, buying and selling it for profit, is obviously at 
least a grade above the "employee" in the economic scale, 
and the same reason for protection which exists as to em-
})loyees does not generally exist as to him. At any rate, 
whether this be the true reason or not, the fact remains that 
a distinction exists under our la'v between employees (as de-
~cribed in 2 (b) and sub-contractors (under 20-a) and the 
former is entitled to compensation, if injured, while the lat-
ter is not. 
See J( eys v. Sugar Grove Lumbe.r Com,pany, 3 0. I. C. 369; 
Large v. Ritter Lwmbe1· Contpany, 6 0. I. C. 194, and later 
cases which have been before this Commission. Moreover, 
in the hvo cases just cited, the Commission did to a certain 
extent discuss the character of control resting in the prin-
eipal in determining that the claimants were sub-contractors. 
~rhat was necessary because Section 12 at the time of these 
derisions contained la1iguage to the effect that nothing in the 
.Lt\.ct should be construed to make the employees of an in-
dependent contractor the employees of his principal. Evi-
dently recognizing that this language was so con-
page 10 ~ fusing and, possibly, even contradictory to Sec-
tion 20 (a), the General Assembly of 1924 struck 
it out entirely. In determining such questions now, there-
fore, we are confined to the tests laid do'vn in Section 20 
(a) and to them, alone. The fact that the deceased may have 
been at times in the past engaged by N ussman & Cox, some 
times possibly as a laborer or employee, would have no bear-
Ing upon the present case when we have the facts. of it fully 
set out. We are confronted 'vith the situation at the time of 
his death, and the status he then occupied. .A.s a matter of 
fact, under the testimony in the record, if we did look back 
of the situation at the time of the death of the deceasea, .u. 
would rather tend to show that most of the time he operated 
as a sub-contractor. 
Neither is it particularly material that Nussman and Cox 
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reported the deceased on their payroll to the insurer and, 
consequently, paid the premium to the ·insurer upon the 
amount paid the deceased. All that the insurer is obligated 
to do under the Compensation Act, is to take carE! of the 
employer's liability theretmder. If t.he employer is not liable 
for compensation to its sub-contractor, neither is its in~ 
surer. If a mistake has been made and the employer had 
failed to report all of its payroll to its insurer, this Com-
mission would none the less not hesitate to award compensa-
tion against the insurer to an employee whose earnings had 
11ot been so reported, if c.ompensation liability rested upon 
the employer in the case. So, where the em-\ 
page 11 ~ ployer has reported a sub-contractor as a. part of 
its payroll to its insurer, the adjustment of mis-
takes of this sort rests solely between the employer .and its 
insurer and is a matter with which this Commission has noth-
ing to do. 
For the reasons given, the full Commission affirms the 
opinion of the I-Ieariug Commissioner and adopts it, with the 
amendments made below, in addition to what is here set out 
as the opinion of the Commission. 
In the brief of counsel for the claimant, it is set out that 
the following facts are e~tablished in the evidence: 
1. ''Baker had been in his employ.tnent for sev(~ll years, 
sometimes being paid by the job and at others by the time. 
2. N ussman considered him an employee, and his service 
was performed in that understanding. 
3. He was carried on the payroll along ·with the other em-
ployees. 
4. He 'vas included among· the employees in th(~ lists of 
those furnished to the Insurance ·carrier, and his inclusion 
therein doubtless formed in part the basis upon which the 
premium was calculated. 
5. The accident was reported to the Insurance Carrier as 
an injury to an employee. 
page 12 ~ 6. In the report of the accident to the Commis-
sion, he was declared to be an employee, and not-
withstrulding the attempt on the part of the Insurance Ca.r-
rier to get the employers to modify this report, they refused 
to do so. 
7. Nussman and Cox and other employees 'vorking on the 
premises and on the building at the same time, ·and N us.sman 
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testified that he was himself present supervising and direct-
ing the entire work. 
8. Nussma.n had the right to say 'vhen and where Baker 
should work.. See his evidence on pages 25 and 26. The 
testimony is not before us as we write this, but a reference 
to the evidence will disclose that this witness, in answer to a 
~question of counsel whether he had the right to say how, 
when and where BEtker should perform the work, he said: 
''Yes, I put him there''; and when .asked by the Commis-
sioner as to what 'vas the extent of the ·control which he 
reserved, he said, in substance, that he had the right to tell 
him when and where to work and to direct him so that there 
would be no interference with the other work which was be-
ing done, and he further testified that he had the right to 
stop him from that work and put him to doing something 
else. This condition negatives sub-contrac.torship. '' It is 
further stated that the above facts were not in-
page 13 ~ eluded in the findings made by the 'Hearing Com.-
missioner. The full ·Commission, therefore., 
amends the findings of fact of the Hearing Commissioner and 
includes as a part thereof the facts above set out. The rea-
sons above given for our decision seem to us to show that the 
facts so included do not in any way cha:nge the essential 
situation in the ·case. Whatever mav have been the views of 
N ussman and Cox, we must decide. whether or not the de ... 
·ceased was an employee or a sub-contraetor under the evi-
dence as produced before us. It has already been pointed 
out that the character of control exercised by ~ussman and 
Gox is by no means the determining factor in the case. 
Claim No. 86501 
Case of Madison B·aker. 
NOTICE OF AWARD. 
Date March 29, 1928. 
To Nussman & Cox (Employer) 
West W ashingt.on Street, 
Suffolk, Virginia . 
. and ~Irs. Ella Baker, ef als., (Claimants) 
R. F. D. #2, Box #25, 
Suffolk, Virginia. 
and American I\£utual Liability 
Insurance Company (Insurance Carrier) 
Norfolk, Virginia, and 
Richmond, Virginia. 
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page 14~ You are hereby notified that a hearing was held 
in i;he above styled case before Comnrissioner 
J(izer, at Suffolk, Virginia, on February 9, 1928, and a de-
cision rendered on ~{arch 17, 1928, dismissing this claim on 
the ground that the deceased was not an employee, but a 
sub-contractor. Therefore, under Section 2 (b) of the Com-
pensation Act, the dependents of the deceased employee are 
not entitled to· compensation~ 
Each party will pay his own costs in tlus proceeding. 
INDUS~rRIAL COl\fMISSION. OF VIRGINIA. 
BOLLING H. fiANDY, Chairman • 
.Attest: 
W. F. BUH.SEY, Secretary. 
:1\.fadison Baker (deceased), Employee; Ella Baker, et als., 
Claimants; 
v. 
Nussman and Cox, Employers; American Mutual Liability 
Insurance Company, Insurer. 
Claim No. 86501. 
March 17, 1928. 
Claimant appeared in person. 
page 15 ~ John N. S'ebrell, Jr., and John M. Lovelace for 
the claimants. 
Holland and 'V oodward for the defendants. 
R. Clarence Dozier and Louis Nelson, Jr., for the In.., 
surer. 
Hearing before Commissioner l{izer, at Suffolk, Virginia, 
February 9, 1928. 
Kizer, Commissioner, rendered the opinion. 
FINDIN·GS OF FACT. 
This claim was heard upon petition of· Ella Baker, widow 
of ~iadison Baker, who lost his life on September 16, 1927, 
while doing contract work for the defendants, Nussman and 
Cox. 
The sole question before the Commission is whether ~iadi­
son Baker was an employee or sub-contractor of the defend-
ants. 
The testimony indicates the widow is 51 years of age and 
resided with her husband at the time of his death. A daugh-
Ella Baker v. Nussman & Cox, etc. 17 
ter, Betty Theresa, 21 ·years of age, and as well 4 grand-
children resided with the claimant arid her husband. The 
· tgTandchildren, viz., Willie Norman Gary, aged 9 years, Da-
vid Baker, aged 8 years; Anna Baker, aged 6 years, and Anna 
1\iay Gary, aged 12 years, ·were all dependerit upon the de-
ceased for support; but, under the provisions of 
page 16 } Section 40 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
the daughter would not be entitled to compensa-
tion, since she has attained the age of 18 years. Should it 
be found that 1\Iadison Baker 'vas an employee of Nussman 
and Cox at the time of the accident, Ella Baker and the 4 
grandchildren would be entitled to compensation. 
The employer has taken the position that 1\'[adisou Baker 
was an employee and not a sub-contractor; but 'vhat consti-
tutes an employee or sub-contractor is a question of la,v, de-
pending on whether the facts bring a person ·within the law's 
designation of either status. The employer's insurance car-
rier is ultimately responsible for the payment of such com-
pensation as may be a'varded and is, therefore, entitled to 
set up such defense as the employer himself could use. 
'l,l1e factR indicate that :Madison Baker had 5 mules and 1 
horse. 2 wagons and 2 scrapers, which he used in his work .. 
!His wife testified that he did a lot of work, such as, building 
roads, p;radin.g- roads and hauling for people. A good por"-
tion of his work was done under contract. Several witnesses 
testified that Baker preferred to do the work under contract, 
at so much the job, rather than on a per diem. basis, since 
he could use his teams and equipment to better advantage. 
The facts indicate, and the widow so testified, that, at the 
time of the accident, the decedent 'vas moving for 
page 17 } the defendants some debris from a building dam-
ag-ed by fire, and that he was furnishing his mules 
and wagon and had his son and another helper, Emmett By-
num, working for him. Baker paid his son and BYI~um for their 
work. The widow claims her husband was paid about $25.00 
to $30.00 per week for his work; but, at the time he was on 
this job, he does not se~m to have informed her exactly what 
his income was or whether any part of it 'vas an advance-
ment. She does admit, however, that, out of the money paid 
him, it was necessary for him himself to pay his help. While 
working on this particular job, he delivered sand to persons 
other than this defendant. 
S. L. N ussman, a defendant, testified that his firm was re-
placing a building 'vhich was destroyed by fire and so badly 
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damaged that it was .necessary to talre down the front and 
rear \valls to the second floor joists. The roof had fallen 
in and the debris was to be cleared up and the building re-
paired and put into condition. Baker was engaged at the 
price of $180.oo· to clear up the debris and take the walls down. 
Baker was to furnish his own help, teams and w·agons, and 
was not on any hourly or daily basis. This witness testified 
that Baker hired, kept the time of, and also paid his own 
helpers. In fact, Nnssman, did not know how many helpers 
Baker had, nor did he interfere with them in any 
page 18 ~ way. The defendants bad other men working on 
· this job on an hourly basis, and the only super-
vision exercised over Baker by the defendau ts was to the 
extent that he '~loulcl work to the advantage of the other men. 
On the nature of this worU and the fact that Baker was re-
quired to execute same for a stated sum, the testimony of 
.l\:Ir. Nussman is very clear, being as follows: 
'' Q. !.(: * * while he was \Vorking for you on this $1.80.00 job, 
you had a right to stop him from that and pnt him on an-
other job and still pay him for the $180.00 job and not pay 
him for the other \Vork J? 
''A. If I would have taken him from this job and put him 
on another, I would have paid him for this job and not for 
the other job where he was taken away. 
'' Q. If you had asked him to do some other work for you 
at the time he was doing this $180.00 job, yon would have 
paid him for that work? 
''A. I usually paid him for what he did. 
'' Q. And you would still, would you not, when he then 
ffinished the contract on Uw $180.00 joh,-you would have 
paid him the $180.00 for that 1 
page 19 ~ ''A. Yes, sir.'' 
The employer testified that, averagi1;g the wage Baker had 
earned while working for him on previous jobs, he w.as of 
the opinion that he earned $27.50 per week. Thh Commis-
sion finds that Baker's wages was customarily $27.50 per 
\veek, but that for this particular job he w·as paid a flat con-
tract price of $180.()0 for himself, the use of his team and 
\vagon and his two· helpers. 
The facts indicate that Baker had just worked a week on 
this contract nncl that he was advanced $100.00 at one time, 
$:-30.00 another time, and finally $50.00, or the full amount of 
'$180.00. rl,hese amounts were placed opposite the name of 
1\Iadison Baker on the pay-roll of defe11dants, with the brief 
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explanation that they w·ere "on account", or for "tearing 
down" or "wrecking building". The record regarding the 
other employees gives their names, hours of labor performed, 
rate and amounts paid each. · 
Nussman further testified that he did not attempt to say 
what Baker was to do with the money .paid the latter fo~ 
the w·ork; that he employed Baker and his team, and that he 
directed him what to do, and Baker 'vould have 
page 20 ~ his own men do the work. The only direction 
given by the defendant "ras so that Baker should 
work to the adva.ntag·e of defendants' employees; but, as to 
the means ·employed by Baker or as to the number of help-
ers he had, that was of no interest to the defendants. 
The 'testimony of other witnesses was duly considered and 
shows that they knew that Baker was in the contracting busi-
ness in Suffolk, but their testimony has no bearing on this 
·case since none of the witnesses had any knowledge relative 
to the understanding between Baker and the defendants. 
Emmett Bynum testified that he was hired by Baker, who 
also directed him in the work as well as paid him for his 
services. Nussman never gave any directions to Bynum, but 
it appears that Baker exercised such control over him as an 
employer would have over an employee. 
Wise l\Iitchell also testified that he worked for Baker on 
this job and that he considered Baker his employer. 
From the above facts together with a careful analysis of 
all the testimony, this Commission makes the finding that 
Baker was not an employee of Nussman and Cox at the time 
of the accident of September 16, 1927, which resulted in his 
death. · 
page 21 ~ - CONCLUSIONS OF LAW .. 
Section 2 (b) of the '\Vorl<men 's Compensation Act de-
scribes an employee as any person ''in the service of another 
under any contract of hire * ,:,;. * written or implied." 'Vhat 
constitutes an employee is a question of la'v; but, whether 
the facts bring a person 'vithin the la,v's designation, is 
usually a question of fact. See Stonega Coke and Coal Com• 
pany v. SuJherlcvnd, 118 S. E. 133. While the employer may 
consider Baker an employee "because he hired him", such 
an assertion is not binding on this Oommission. The facts 
in this case do not show a contract of hire but rather a con-
tract whereby a certain job would be done for a specific sum 
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by a person equipped to do such work according to his own 
means and method, the other party to the contract being in-
terested solely in the results obtained. The defendants had 
no control over the number of helper~ Baker had, neither did 
they exercise any control over such helpers. The only CQn-
trol exercised was to have Baker work at such places in the 
l?ttilding as 'vonld be of advantage and, at least, not a hinder-
ance to the defendants' own employees. The general control 
over the means and method of doing this ·work and the num-
bers of helpers to be engaged was clearly with Baker him-
self. 
Baker was a sub-contractor of Nussman and 
page 22 ~ Cox, and, as sueh, is not covered under the . pro-
visions of the 'V orkmen 's Co;mpensation Act,, 
'vhich applies only to employees. See Large v. lV. Jl,f.. Ritter 
L'lMnber C01n1Jauy, 6 0. I. C. 194, and Shupe v. R. J. Garter 
L'ltlJnber C01npany, 6 0. I. C. 205, 'vherein the facts and con-
clusions of law will be found to be as above . 
. This claim is,. therefore, dismissed on the ground that 
Baker was not an employee of Nussman and Cox under Sec-
tion 2 (b) of the Act, but 'vas, in fact, a sub-contractor. 
page 23 ~ I, W. F. Bursey, Secretary, Industrial Commis-
sion of Virginia, hereby certify that the foregoing 
is a true and correct copy as the same appears of record in 
the files of this office, of the .A. 'vards, Statement of Findings 
of Fact and other mutters pertinent to the questious at issue 
in Claim No. 86501-~fadison Baker, (deceased Employee), 
Ella Baker, et als., Claimants, v. Nussman and Cox, Em-
ployers, and American ~Iutnal Liability Insurance Company, 
Insurer. 
I further certify that S. S. P. Patteson, Attorney for the 
defendants, had notice of intention of claimant to request 
certified copy of the record for the purpose of appeal. 
Given under mv hand and the seal of the Industrial Com-
mission of Virg·i;1ia this 18th day of October, H>:28. 
\V. F. BURSEY, Secretary. 
(Seal.) IND·UsrrRIAL COl\II\IISSION OF VIRGINIA. 
A Copy-Teste: . 
II. STE\V AHT JONIDS, C. C. 
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